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How Large Is the Private Sector in Africa? 
Evidence from National Accounts and Labor Markets
1 
 
In recent years, the private sector has been recognized as a key engine of Africa’s economic 
development. Yet, the most simple and fundamental question remains unanswered: how 
large is the African private sector? We present novel estimates of the size of the private 
sector in 50 African countries derived from the analysis of national accounts and labor market 
data. Our results point to a relatively large size of the African private sector. National account 
data shows that this accounts for about 2/3 of total investments, 4/5 of total consumption and 
3/4 of total credit. In relative terms, large private sector countries are concentrated in Western 
Africa (Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, Senegal and Togo), Central Africa (Cameroun, Republic 
of Congo) and Eastern Africa (Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania), with the addition of 
Mauritius. Countries with small private sectors include a sample of oil-exporters (Algeria, 
Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Nigeria), some of the poorest countries in the continent 
(Burundi, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Sao Tome e Principe), Zambia and 
Botswana. Over the last ten years, the size of the private sector has been contracting 
significantly in oil exporting countries, although the variation in its size does not appear to be 
significantly correlated with growth performance. Labor market data reinforces the idea of a 
large private sector, which provides about 90% of total employment opportunities. However, 
most of this labor is informal and characterized by low productivity: permanent wage jobs in 
the private sector account on average for only 10% of total employment (a share similar to 
that provided by public administration and state owned enterprises). South Africa is the 
notable exception, with formal wage employment in the private sector representing 46% of 
total employment. Finally, we find evidence of negative private sector earning premiums, 
suggesting that market distortions abound. These are likely to prevent the efficient allocation 
of human resources, and to reduce the overall productivity of the African economies. 
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Fifty years of post colonial history have seen deep transformations in the role and size of the 
private sector in Africa
2, led mostly by ideological shifts. Immediately after independence, many 
countries experimented with socialist systems in which states were in charge of the production of 
commodities and services. This development model encountered great challenges in the 1980s as 
commodity prices fell, and most African economies experienced a prolonged economic collapse. In 
the 1990s, macroeconomic and structural reforms brought a reduction of the scope of the public 
sector.  
In recent years, the private sector has been recognized as a key engine of economic development 
in  Africa  as  well  as  in  other  parts  of  the  developing  world.  This  shift  has  been  translated  into 
development finance institutions’ policies, which have made private sector development one of their 
strategic pillars. In parallel, a wealth of data was collected to document the constraints to doing 
business and to inform regulatory reforms aimed to unlock private sector led economic development 
(for example Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys data). 
Yet, development practitioners have limited information on the size of the African private sector. 
The most simple and fundamental questions remain largely unanswered: how large is the private 
sector in Africa? How has its size evolved over the last decade? This is the focus of our paper.  
Knowing the size of the private sector is relevant for policy makers, donors and development 
finance institutions. The type of private sector development policy needed in each country, as well 
as the expected impacts, will fundamentally depend on the size and characteristics of private sector 
activities. Where the private sector is large, entrepreneurship is likely to exist, and policies that 
alleviate the constraints to its development will have a strong effect on growth. On the other hand, 
countries with a small private sector may first need to develop entrepreneurial skills, and any effects 
on growth are likely to be experienced with a lag. 
Our estimates of the size of the private sector are based on national accounts and labor market 
data.  Most  national  account  data  is  from  the master  data  set of the  African  Economic Outlook 
2009/10, which covers 50 African countries (all but Eritrea, Somalia and Zimbabwe) over the period 
1996-2008. Data on credit is from the World Development Indicators. Finally, labor markets are 
analyzed through household and labor force survey data for a sample of 16 African countries. 
We find that the African private sector is relatively large, with a few outliers concentrated amongst 
resource rich countries. National account data shows that the private sector accounts for about 2/3 
of total investments and 4/5 of total consumption. Investment and consumption reported in the 
national accounts represent components of aggregate demand rather than production. Public sector 
demand will equal public sector production only in few special cases; for example if public sector 
consumption,  made  mostly  of  wages,  equals  the  value  of  the  services  supplied  by  the  public 
administration, and if public sector investment equals the maintenance cost and the value of the 
services provided by public infrastructure. Although we are aware that such special cases are not 
prevalent, we still argue that public sector consumption and investment are useful indicators of the 
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magnitude of government’s involvement in the economy. Where these are large, the government 
controls a big share of aggregate demand and decides how available resources are spent. The private 
sector,  which  is  the  complement  to  aggregate  demand,  will  have  a  small  size.  Therefore,  the 
measures presented in this paper are a useful first approximation of the size of the African public and 
private sectors, and a starting point for discussion and future refinement of measurement.  
The private sector also accounts for about 3/4 of total credit. Credit is a key determinant of private 
sector production; when governments absorb most available credit, the private sector is likely to be 
constrained by lack of finance.  
Labor market data reinforces the idea of a large private sector, as this provides about 90% of total 
employment  opportunities.  However,  most  of  this  labor  is  informal  and  characterized  by  low 
productivity: permanent wage jobs in the private sector account for only 10% of total employment. 
Governments create a similar amount of formal wage jobs in public administrations and state owned 
enterprises,  hence  about  4/5s  of  total  employment  are  made  of  casual  or  temporary  wage 
employment, small scale farming and unregistered self-employment.  
The analysis of national accounts and labor markets aimed at assessing the size of the African 
private sector has high content of novelty. Most of the data presented in this paper has not been 
previously  published.  It  is  reported  in  a  systematic  fashion  to  inform  future  research  by  other 
scholars and policy making within country governments and international organizations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and methodology. Section 3 
analyzes the size of the private sector as recorded in national accounts, and the relationship between 
private sector size and economic growth. Section 4 looks at the share of private sector employment, 
and assesses the existence of private sector earning premiums. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. Data and Methodology 
3 
Evidence on the private share of total consumption and investment is from the master data set of 
the African Economic Outlook 2009/10, covering 50 African countries (all but Zimbabwe, Somalia 
and Eritrea). The reference period is 1996-08 for all countries but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), 
Guinea  Bissau  (2001-08),  Uganda  (2000-08),  Gambia  (2000-08)  and  Sudan  (1999-08).  The  public 
sector  includes  both  the  public  administration  and  state  owned  enterprises.  Gross  Domestic 
Product (GDP) and inflation series are from the same source.  
Information on credit to public and private sector is from the World Development Indicators. Time 
series were extracted for the same period and sample of countries covered by the African Economic 
Outlook (AEO) data. 
We measure the size of the private sector in two ways. First, we calculate the ratio between private 
and total consumption, investment and credit. The denominator is made of the sum of both private 
and public components. Second, we calculate the ratio between private consumption, investment 
and credit, and GDP. In both cases, numerator and denominator are the summation of yearly values 
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over the period of analysis. While both measures provide useful evidence, we focus our discussion on 
the former, which captures the way in which the economy is organized and is independent from the 
stage  of  economic  development.  This  cannot  be  said  of  the  latter  measure,  which  has  GDP  as 
denominator.  
We also look at the correlation between the size of the private sector and GDP growth. First, we 
cross-tabulate the private share of investment, consumption and credit over the period 1996-2002 (t) 
and GDP growth over the period 2003-08 (t+1). Then, we cross-tabulate growth in the private share 
of investment, consumption and credit (2003-08 minus 1996-2002, i.e. (t+1)-t) and GDP growth over 
the period 2003-08. In all cases, significance of the correlation is measured through the t-statistic of 
the slope (in a simple Y=a+bX regression model where Y represents GDP growth). 
Estimates of the proportion of private sector employment are based on 22 household and labor 
force surveys from 16 countries, with data collected between 1988 and 2009. For each country, at 
least  one  survey  was  conducted  over  the  period  2002-2009.  A  complete  list  of  data  sources  is 
provided in Table A1 in Annex.
4 Samples are in general nationally representative, with the exception 
of Senegal 2003 1-2-3 Survey, which covers only the city of Dakar.  
Wage differentials are analyzed through multivariate analysis to control for individual and job 
characteristics. The model can be written as follows: 
  i i i i i i u PRIV SOE X w           ln             (1) 
 
where  wi  represents  worker  i’s  weekly  earnings,  the  vector  Xi  denotes  individual  and  job 
characteristics,  SOE  and  PRIV  are  dummy  variables  indicating  employment  respectively  in  state 
owned enterprises and in the private sector; λi is the Inverse-Mills-Ratio included to correct the 
selection bias due to the fact that those whose earnings are reported differ from other individuals; β, 
φ, φ and δ are parameters to be estimated and ui is a random disturbance. We run one regression for 
each combination of country and year. The estimate of the coefficient φ will measure the wage 
premium associated with private sector employment (relative to public sector employment, which is 
the omitted category).
5 
In Egypt and Rwanda, information on earnings is collected only for wage employees . In all other 
countries, earnings are surveyed also for the self-employed.  
The vector X includes the following variables:  gender (one dummy variable for female gender), age 
(four dummy variables for age 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, with 15-24 omitted category), education 
(five dummy variables for primary, lower secondary, vocatio nal, secondary, and tertiary education, 
with less than primary omitted category), residence (a set of dummy variables for rural residence and 
for the regions in the country), sector of activity (two dummy variables for industry and services, with 
agriculture omitted category), labor market state (four dummy variables for informal/temporary 
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the earning premium for secondary education (relative to no -schooling) ranges from a minimum of 24% in 
Ghana to a maximum of 150% in Zambia.  This is the focus of a companion forthcoming paper (Abebe , Diarra 
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wage employed, employer, self-employed, and unpaid family worker, with formal/permanent wage 
employed omitted category), number of hours worked over the week.  
Estimation is performed using the Heckman command in STATA. Household size, a dummy variable 
for household head and the dependency ratio (number of children and elderly in the household 
divided  by  household  size)  are  used  as  selection  variables  in  Heckman’s  first  stage, as  they  are 
assumed to affect the likelihood to work but to be unrelated with the weekly wage once working. 
3. The size of the private sector: evidence from national accounts 
The private sector accounts for about 2/3 of investments and 4/5 of consumption.
6 Between 1996 
and  2008,  the  private  sector  accounted  for  66%  of  African  investments  and  79%  of  African 
consumption. Country variability was wide. 
The private sector’s share of total investment ranged from 18% in Burundi to 89% in Morocco 
(Figure 1 and Table 1). No significant difference was observed across country groups (low versus 
middle income countries, and oil exporters versus oil importers).  
The private sector’s share of total consumption ranged from a minimum of 54% in Angola to a 
maximum of 92% in Guinea (Figure 2 and Table 1). This share was significantly higher in low income 
countries (81% against 74% in  middle income countries), and significantly lower in oil exporting 
countries (75% against 80% for net oil importers), suggesting that oil revenues are associated with an 
expansion of government activities. 
In relative terms, large private sector countries were concentrated in Western Africa (Cote d’Ivoire, 
Guinea, Niger, Senegal and Togo), Central Africa (Cameroun, Republic of Congo) and Eastern Africa 
(Kenya,  Sudan,  Uganda  and  Tanzania),  with  the  addition  of  Mauritius  (Figure  3).  In  all  these 
countries, the private shares of both consumption and investment exceeded the median African 
value,  and  the  private  sector  accounted  for  about  80%  of  aggregate  domestic  demand.  It  is 
noteworthy that no Northern African country is part of this group. 
Countries with small private sectors included a sample of oil-exporters (Algeria, Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea, Libya and Nigeria), some of the poorest countries in the continent (Burundi, Burkina Faso, 
Guinea Bissau, Mali and Sao Tome e Principe), and Zambia and Botswana. In these countries, the 
private share of both consumption and investment was below the continental median. 
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Figure 1 – Private sector’s share of total investment in selected African countries (1996-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data. Note: reference period 1996-08 for all countries 
but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and Sudan (1999-08). Countries are 
divided in low income or African Development Fund (ADF), and middle income or African Development Bank (ADB), as for the African 
Development Bank Group’s definition. 
 
Figure 2 – Private sector’s share of total consumption in selected African countries (1996-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data. Note: reference period 1996-08 for all countries 
but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and Sudan (1999-08). Countries are 
divided in low income or African Development Fund (ADF), and middle income or African Development Bank (ADB), as for the African 
Development Bank Group’s definition. 
 7 
 
Figure 3 – Small and large private sector countries (1996-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data. Note: reference period 1996-08 for all countries 
but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and Sudan (1999-08).  
 
Results are broadly consistent when private investment and consumption are normalized by GDP. 
A few differences are highlighted below, the main one being that the size of the private sector in 
Western and Central African countries appears relatively smaller.  
Private investment represented on average 15% of GDP, varying from a minimum of 2% in Burundi 
to a maximum of 34% in Cape Verde (Figure 4 and Table 1), with no statistically significant difference 
across  country  groups.  South  Africa  and  some  Western  and  Central  African  countries  like  Cote 
d’Ivoire, Togo and Democratic Republic of Congo -which were in the right hand tail of the distribution 
in  Figure  1,  where  private  investment  was  normalized  by  total  investment-  appeared  to  have 
relatively little private sector investment. The opposite was true for Ghana, Sao Tome e Principe, 
Algeria, Botswana and Equatorial Guinea. 
Private consumption accounted for 68% of GDP, varying from a minimum of 11% in Equatorial 
Guinea to a maximum of 110% in Lesotho (Figure 5 and Table 1). Notably, its relative size was 
significantly larger in low income countries (74% against 50% of GDP in middle income countries) and 
significantly smaller in oil exporting countries (49% against 75% in oil importing countries). Compared 
to the ranking based on the share of total consumption, private consumption appeared relatively 
smaller in Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon, and relatively larger in Burundi and Lesotho.  8 
 
Figure 4 – Relative size of private investment (relative to GDP) in selected African countries (1996-
2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data. Note: reference period 1996-08 for all countries 
but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and Sudan (1999-08). Countries are 
divided in low income or African Development Fund (ADF), and middle income or African Development Bank (ADB), as for the African 
Development Bank Group’s definition. 
 
Figure 5 – Relative size of private  consumption (relative to GDP) in selected African countries 
(1996-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data. Note: reference period 1996-08 for all countries 
but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and Sudan (1999-08). Countries are 
divided in low income or African Development Fund (ADF), and middle income or African Development Bank (ADB), as for the African 
Development Bank Group’s definition. 
 9 
 
The private sector receives 3/4 of total credit. Over the period 1996-2008, 74% of total credit went 
to the private sector. The statistic refers to a subset of 48 countries for which both credit to the 
private sector and total credit were positive. Libya and Botswana cannot be included in the sample as 
the governments, in the process of repaying previous public debt, determined a situation of overall 
negative borrowing.  
The private share of credit varied between a minimum of 8% in Liberia and a maximum of 211% in 
Angola  (Figure  6  and  Table  1).  No  statistically  significant  difference  was  found  across  country 
groupings. 
Credit to the private sector amounted on average to 21% of GDP, varying from a minimum of 4% in 
Ghana and Sierra Leone to a maximum of 121% in Zambia (Figure 7 and Table 1). The share was 
significantly lower in post-conflict countries (10% of GDP against 23% in the rest of the sample) and 
in low income countries (17% against 32% in middle income countries). This is not surprising, as this 
statistic is affected by the level of financial market development, which is in turn correlated with the 
stage of economic development. Consequently, countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Angola, Sao Tome e Principe, Madagascar, Benin and Burkina Faso -in which most of credit went to 
the private sector (see Figure 6)- show very low levels of private sector borrowing when this is 
normalized by GDP. This simply means that no matter the fact that the available credit goes to 
private sector entities, this credit remains extremely scarce. 10 
 
 
Figure 6 - Private sector’s share of total credit in selected African countries (1996-2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on World Development Indicators and African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data. Note: bars are 
capped for improved visibility. Reference period 1996-08 for all countries but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), 
Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and Sudan (1999-08). Countries are divided in low income or African Development Fund (ADF), and 
middle income or African Development Bank (ADB), as for the African Development Bank Group’s definition. 
 
Figure 7 - Relative size of private sector credit (relative to GDP) in selected African countries (1996-
2008) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on World Development Indicators and African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data. Note: bars are 
capped for improved visibility. Reference period 1996-08 for all countries but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), 
Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and Sudan (1999-08). Countries are divided in low income or African Development Fund (ADF), and 
middle income or African Development Bank (ADB), as for the African Development Bank Group’s definition.  11 
 
 
Table 1 – Size of the private sector in selected African countries (1996-2008) 




































Angola  0.42  0.54  2.11  0.07  0.35  0.07 
Benin  0.64  0.86  1.49  0.12  0.75  0.14 
Burkina Faso  0.53  0.77  1.06  0.09  0.76  0.14 
Burundi  0.18  0.80  0.67  0.02  0.87  0.23 
Cameroon  0.86  0.88  0.71  0.15  0.72  0.09 
Cape Verde  0.86  0.80  0.84  0.34  0.81  0.27 
Central African Rep.  0.58  0.88  0.40  0.06  0.84  0.06 
Chad  0.81  0.58  0.34  0.20  0.40  0.09 
Comoros  0.52  0.86  0.64  0.07  0.92  0.44 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.87  0.90  0.97  0.14  0.79  0.05 
Congo, Rep. of  0.78  0.72  0.80  0.22  0.32  0.10 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.70  0.90  0.71  0.08  0.72  0.15 
Djibouti  0.68  0.72  0.42  0.14  0.70  0.09 
Ethiopia  0.40  0.87  0.75  0.09  0.81  0.10 
Gambia  0.58  0.89  0.42  0.14  0.81  0.05 
Ghana  0.57  0.82  0.35  0.16  0.77  0.04 
Guinea  0.79  0.92  0.66  0.15  0.78  0.14 
Guinea Bissau  0.52  0.78  0.46  0.13  0.73  0.05 
Kenya  0.73  0.82  0.13  0.12  0.75  0.27 
Lesotho  0.88  0.75  0.85  0.29  1.10  0.25 
Liberia  0.74  0.72  0.08  0.31  0.67  0.13 
Madagascar  0.64  0.90  0.86  0.14  0.83  0.12 
Malawi  0.53  0.88  0.78  0.10  0.87  0.24 
Mali  0.64  0.80  1.46  0.14  0.70  0.16 
Mauritania  0.79  0.78  0.98  0.23  0.72  0.41 
Mozambique  0.50  0.89  1.95  0.11  0.81  0.15 
Niger  0.72  0.82  0.77  0.14  0.75  0.09 
Nigeria  0.64  0.72  0.97  0.15  0.47  0.14 
Rwanda  0.54  0.83  0.11  0.08  0.85  0.06 
Sao Tome e Principe  0.44  0.63  0.94  0.16  0.69  0.09 
Senegal  0.74  0.85  0.71  0.16  0.77  0.18 
Sierra Leone  0.63  0.87  0.14  0.07  0.87  0.04 
Sudan  0.77  0.85  0.63  0.17  0.71  0.10 
Tanzania  0.71  0.83  0.79  0.16  0.72  0.18 
Togo  0.80  0.86  0.80  0.12  0.88  0.12 
Uganda  0.76  0.85  0.85  0.16  0.78  0.09 















Algeria  0.65  0.74  0.56  0.20  0.39  0.54 
Botswana  0.65  0.63  .  0.21  0.37  0.17 
Egypt  0.54  0.86  0.46  0.10  0.74  0.20 
Equatorial Guinea  0.61  0.75  0.92  0.23  0.11  0.19 
Gabon  0.74  0.72  0.42  0.19  0.34  0.12 
Libya  0.32  0.66  .  0.09  0.25  0.16 
Mauritius  0.72  0.82  0.74  0.18  0.65  0.48 
Morocco  0.89  0.77  0.70  0.25  0.60  0.39 
Namibia  0.67  0.72  0.91  0.15  0.59  0.29 
Seychelles  0.85  0.59  0.28  0.27  0.48  0.25 
South Africa  0.71  0.77  0.82  0.12  0.63  0.64 
Swaziland  0.62  0.82  1.23  0.10  0.76  0.18 
Tunisia  0.79  0.80  0.93  0.20  0.62  0.55 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data and World Development Indicators. Reference 
period 1996-08 for all countries but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and 
Sudan (1999-08). Countries are divided in low income or African Development Fund (ADF), and middle income or African Development 
Bank (ADB), as for the African Development Bank Group’s definition. 12 
 
After measuring the size of the private sector, we now turn to analyze how this evolved over the 
course of the last decade, and its correlation with GDP growth performance. As variables normalized 
by GDP are likely to be correlated with the stage of economic development (as in the case of credit to 
the private sector), we focus hereafter on measures that abstract from the total size of consumption, 
investment and credit. 
The size of the private sector remained stable over the period 1996-2008. On average, the private 
sector’s shares of total consumption and investment did not change significantly between 1996-2002 
and 2003-08 (Table 2).  
Yet, stability on average masks very different trends. At one end of the distribution, the private 
sector grew most remarkably in Liberia, where the private shares of consumption, investment and 
credit  increased  respectively  by  26,  3  and  18  percentage  points.  At  the  opposite  end  of  the 
distribution, the private sector recorded the strongest contraction in Equatorial Guinea, where the 
private shares of investment and consumption fell by 45 and 5 percentage points respectively (data 
on credit not available).  
The private share of investment fell by 9% in oil exporting countries, while it increased by 5% for 
oil importers. This 14% difference is statistically highly significant. A possible explanation is that oil 
production  was  associated  with  increased  state  engagement  in  the  economy.  This  may  be  a 
consequence of governments using oil revenues for investments in infrastructure. 
The private share of investment was positively correlated with countries’ investment rate (defined 
as investment over GDP). This suggests that the private sector played a more important role where 
capital  accumulation  was  faster  (Figure  8).  Variability  was  wide.  While  both  Angola  and  the 
Democratic Republic of Congo invested between 10% and 20% of GDP (on average over the period 
1996-2008), the private share of investment was slightly above 40% for the former and almost 90% 
for the latter. Similarly, while both Ghana and Morocco had investment rates in excess of 30%, the 
private sector accounted for less than 60% in the former and for more than 90% in the latter.  
Nonetheless,  a  large  size  of  the  private  sector  does  not  seem  to  be  associated  with  better 
economic performance. Contrary to our expectation, GDP growth over the period 2003-08 is not 
positively correlated with the private share of total investment, consumption and credit over the 
period 1996-2002 (Figures 9-10-11, panels A). This means that countries in which the private sector 
accounted for a large share of demand and credit (at time t) did not outperform others in which the 
public sector played a more important role. The evidence for consumption is even more surprising as 
it  shows  a  statistically  significant  negative  relationship  between  private  sector  share  and  GDP 
growth.
7  
                                                           
7 The results hold when the group of oil exporting countries is omitted from the analysis. 13 
 
Figure 8 – Relationship between investment rate and private share of investment in selected 
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Total Investment over GDP, 1996-08
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 data. 
 
The findings are broadly confirmed when the analysis focuses on the trends: with the exception of 
private credit, a growing private sector is not associated with better growth performance. Once 
more contrary to our expectation, we find a negative correlation between GDP growth in 2003-08 
and the growth of the private share of investment (Figure 9, panel B). The relationship between GDP 
growth and growth in the private share of consumption is not statistically significant (Figure 10, panel 
B). Notably, we find a positive and statistically significant correlation between growth in the private 
share of credit and GDP growth (Figure 11, panel B).  
This  evidence  is  generally  robust  to  a  change  of  specification  in  which  private  investment, 
consumption and credit are normalized by GDP rather than by their own total. The only differences 
are that: (i) we find a positive and statistically significant correlation between private investment rate 
over  the  period  1996-2002  and  GDP  growth  over  the  period  2003-08,  and;  (ii)  the  relationship 
between change in credit to the private sector and GDP growth ceases to be significant.  
Overall, the results presented in this section indicate that, at least in our sample, growth is not 
explained simply by the form of organization of economic activity. A structure of the economy in 
which investment and consumption are predominantly mandated by the private sector does not 
necessarily lead to faster growth. The same holds for a structure in which most of the credit goes to 
the private sector.  
This may be due to the fact that, although its size is relatively large, the African private sector is 
characterized by low productivity, due to a predominance of small and informal activities. This 
hypothesis can be explored by looking at the structure of African labor markets, which is the focus of 
the next section. 14 
 
Table 2 – Evolution of the size of the private sector in selected African countries (1996-2008) 
      1996-02  2003-08 













































Angola  0.63  0.46  1.09  0.06  0.23  0.58  2.65  0.17 
Benin  0.67  0.85  1.38  0.05  0.60  0.86  1.55  0.04 
Burkina Faso  0.43  0.77  0.92  0.06  0.61  0.78  1.15  0.05 
Burundi  0.15  0.85  0.71  0.02  0.20  0.77  0.63  0.04 
Cameroon  0.86  0.88  0.53  0.04  0.86  0.88  0.95  0.03 
Cape Verde  0.84  0.82  0.85  0.08  0.87  0.79  0.84  0.07 
Central African Rep.  0.60  0.85  0.40  0.03  0.56  0.90  0.39  0.03 
Chad  0.83  0.59  0.34  0.05  0.80  0.56  0.35  0.08 
Comoros  0.50  0.84  0.60  0.02  0.55  0.87  0.68  0.02 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.96  0.92  0.46  -0.03  0.81  0.89  .  0.07 
Congo, Rep. of  0.77  0.70  0.82  0.02  0.79  0.73  0.80  0.05 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.69  0.91  0.67  0.01  0.71  0.90  0.77  0.02 
Djibouti  0.59  0.72  0.17  0.01  0.70  0.73  1.66  0.04 
Ethiopia  0.37  0.85  0.54  0.03  0.42  0.88  1.11  0.11 
Gambia  0.61  0.89  0.69  0.04  0.56  0.89  0.19  0.06 
Ghana  0.54  0.83  0.45  0.04  0.58  0.82  0.27  0.06 
Guinea  0.68  0.92  0.83  0.04  0.86  0.92  0.56  0.03 
Guinea Bissau  0.55  0.80  0.47  -0.01  0.50  0.75  0.45  0.02 
Kenya  0.70  0.82  0.68  0.02  0.75  0.81  0.07  0.05 
Lesotho  0.89  0.76  .  0.02  0.88  0.74  0.74  0.03 
Liberia  0.58  0.71  0.03  0.09  0.84  0.74  0.21  0.06 
Madagascar  0.54  0.91  0.61  0.01  0.69  0.89  1.12  0.06 
Malawi  0.41  0.86  0.48  0.02  0.58  0.89  0.85  0.07 
Mali  0.64  0.81  1.12  0.05  0.64  0.80  2.08  0.05 
Mauritania  0.74  0.82  .  0.02  0.81  0.74  0.73  0.05 
Mozambique  0.58  0.90  1.32  0.09  0.42  0.88  2.62  0.08 
Niger  0.71  0.81  0.64  0.05  0.73  0.82  0.85  0.05 
Nigeria  0.60  0.77  1.06  0.06  0.66  0.69  0.92  0.06 
Rwanda  0.59  0.85  0.97  0.09  0.49  0.82  0.02  0.08 
S. Tome e Principe  0.36  0.62  .  0.08  0.51  0.63  0.94  0.06 
Senegal  0.69  0.85  0.80  0.04  0.77  0.85  0.66  0.04 
Sierra Leone  0.45  0.87  0.06  0.03  0.68  0.87  0.33  0.06 
Sudan  0.87  0.91  0.46  0.07  0.72  0.80  0.69  0.09 
Tanzania  0.73  0.87  0.81  0.05  0.70  0.79  0.74  0.07 
Togo  0.78  0.85  0.81  0.00  0.82  0.87  0.80  0.02 
Uganda  0.74  0.84  1.01  0.07  0.78  0.87  0.66  0.08 















Algeria  0.69  0.75  0.58  0.03  0.62  0.73  0.55  0.04 
Botswana  0.55  0.62  .  0.08  0.72  0.64  .  0.04 
Egypt  0.51  0.87  0.47  0.05  0.57  0.86  0.45  0.06 
Equatorial Guinea  0.89  0.78  .  0.37  0.44  0.73  0.78  0.16 
Gabon  0.74  0.70  0.36  0.00  0.74  0.73  0.50  0.03 
Libya  0.43  0.67  .  0.00  0.30  0.65  .  0.06 
Mauritius  0.69  0.81  0.74  0.05  0.74  0.83  0.74  0.04 
Morocco  0.87  0.77  0.68  0.03  0.91  0.76  0.75  0.05 
Namibia  0.65  0.69  0.95  0.03  0.70  0.74  0.82  0.06 
Seychelles  0.82  0.52  0.47  0.03  0.89  0.65  0.22  0.04 
South Africa  0.72  0.77  1.05  0.03  0.71  0.77  0.81  0.05 
Swaziland  0.71  0.80  1.60  0.02  0.52  0.84  0.92  0.03 
Tunisia  0.77  0.80  0.95  0.05  0.81  0.81  0.92  0.05 
Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 master data and World Development Indicators. Reference period 1996-
08 for all countries but Sao Tome e Principe (2001-08), Guinea Bissau (2001-08), Uganda (2000-08), Gambia (2000-08) and Sudan (1999-08). 
Countries are divided in low income or African Development Fund (ADF), and middle income or African Development Bank (ADB), as for the African 
Development Bank Group’s definition. 
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Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 data. 
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Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 data. 
 























































































0 .5 1 1.5






















































































-1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
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Source: Authors’ elaborations based on African Economic Outlook 2009/10 data and World Development Indicators. 16 
 
4. The size and structure of the private sector: evidence from the labor 
markets 
The  African  private  sector  employs  55%  of  working  age  individuals.
8  The  share  ranges  from  a 
minimum of 30% in Senegal in 2001, to a maximum of 84% in Tanzania in 2006. The result is a 
function of (i) the rates of participation in the labor market, (ii) unemployment rates and (iii) the 
relative weight of the private sector in supplying employment opportunities. 
The rate of labor force participation is extremely heterogeneous, ranging from 32% in Southern 
Sudan in 2010 to 90% in Tanzania in 2006 (Table 3), and not clearly correlated with the stage of 
economic development. Inactivity rates are high in a mix of both low and middle income countries 
(Southern Sudan, Senegal, Egypt, South Africa, Botswana), suggesting that the social fabric plays an 
important role in influencing individuals’ choice to work. Where we dispose of more than one time 
observation, we find that participation rates increased in Egypt (from 60% in 1988 to 63% in 2006) 
and Senegal (from 41% in 2001 to 50% in 2005), while they contracted slightly in South Africa (from 
59% in 2000 to 57% in 2007). 
Unemployment is virtually non-existent in Rwanda, Malawi and Nigeria, while it exceeds 20% in 
Republic  of  Congo  and  South  Africa  (Table  3).  Low  unemployment  rates  often  mask 
underemployment in contexts in which people cannot afford the no-work option. Interestingly, the 
strong increase in labor market participation in Senegal between 2001 and 2005 was accompanied by 
a  sharp  drop  in  the  unemployment  rate,  from  20%  to  10%.  This  suggests  a  fast  rhythm  of  job 
creation. 
Out of 10 workers, 9 work in the private sector (Table 3). The private sector share of employment 
ranges between 71% in Egypt in 1998 and 97% in Tanzania in 2006. The public sector (including state 
owned  enterprises)  is  largest  in  middle  income  countries,  namely  Botswana  (26%  of  total 
employment), Egypt (25% in 2006) and South Africa (16% in 2007). Figure 12 represents graphically 
the latest observation for each country with available data in our sample. 
                                                           
8 Unless differently specified, descriptive statistics are unweighted averages of available country shares. 17 
 
Figure 12 – Public and private sector employment in selected African countries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on household and labor force survey data. Sample: employed working age population.  
 
The above findings may lead to the impression of a large and dynamic private sector employer. 
Yet,  most  private  sector  jobs  are  informal,  with  only  1  out  of  10  workers  holding 
permanent/formal wage employment (Table 3). Non-wage activities provide the majority of private 
sector employment opportunities. Considering only the latest observation available for each country, 
they account for about 2/3 of total jobs (Figure 13), with the share varying from a minimum of 17% in 
South Africa to a maximum of 92% in Mali. The bulk of non-wage employment is made of either self-
employment without  employees  or  unpaid  family work.  Employers  (i.e.  self-employed  with  paid 
employees) are a relatively  large group only in Egypt, where they represent about 11% of total 
employment. This may be partially explained by greater availability of credit for small and medium 
enterprises.  
Overall, middle income countries combine a large public sector and a relatively large formal private 
sector.  In  low  income  countries  such  as  Nigeria,  Mali,  Tanzania,  Ghana  and  Rwanda, 
permanent/formal  wage  employment  in  the  private  sector  represents  less  than  2%  of  total 
employment. Permanent/formal wage employment in the private sector is on the other hand largest 
in the three middle income countries in the sample, peaking at 46% of total employment in South 
Africa,  23%  in  Botswana  and  18%  in  Egypt  (Table  3).  These  are  the  countries  with  the  largest 
combined  formal  sector,  given  also  the  relatively  large  share  of  public  sector  employment.  A 
graphical representation of the latest observation for each country with available data is provided in 
Figure 13. 18 
 
Figure 13 – Formal and informal employment in selected African countries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on household and labor force survey data. Sample: employed working age population. 
In addition to being characterized by a high degree of informality, jobs in the private sector pay on 
average 13% lower earnings than comparable jobs in the public sector. These negative earning 
premiums suggest that the labor markets are rid with distortions. The gap, measured through the 
estimation of equations (1), is largest in South Africa where private sector workers earn 38% less 
than their peers in the public sector. At the other end of the distribution, private sector workers are 
paid relatively more than public sector workers in Egypt, Zambia and Rwanda, with the differential 
peaking at 18% in Rwanda (Figure 14 and Table 4). Sensitivity analysis performed by limiting the 
sample to permanent wage employees only confirm the result (dark column in Figure 14) with the 
exception of Senegal-Dakar, where private sector workers in general are paid 15% less than their 
public sector peers, whereas private sector permanent wage employees are paid 12.5% more than 
their public sector peers. Earning premiums in state owned enterprises are even larger, exceeding 
those in the rest of public sector employment. 
Earning differentials are resilient.  For three countries, we dispose of data from more than one 
household  or  labor  force  survey,  and  can  therefore  analyze  the  trend  in  earning  differentials 
between public and private employment. In the case of Egypt, the positive private sector earning 
premium has been decreasing from 42% in 1998 to 15% in 2006 (Figure 14 and Table 4), while over 
the same period the share of private sector (over total) employment has grown from 70 to 75%. This 
may suggest that increasing labor supply in the private sector has driven earnings down, and/or that 
the  new  entrants  have  started  activities  with  lower  productivity.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
phenomenon could also be explained with government decisions aimed to fill the gap in public 
employees’ wages relative to the private sector. In Ghana, where the public sector pays more than 19 
 
the private sector, earning differentials have been decreasing from 26% in 1999 to 14% in 2005. This 
may hint to encouraging progress towards the elimination of distortions. On the other hand, in South 
Africa negative private sector earning premiums were practically stable, measuring 38% in 2000 and 
36% in 2007.  
The above results have serious implications, as negative private sector earning premiums may 
reduce private sector development by leading high skill individuals to less productive (but better 
paid) jobs in the public sector. Earning distortions may create perverse incentives to  queue for 
public  sector  jobs  in  search  of  greater  stability  and  higher  wages,
9  instead of pursuing  highly 
productive private sector business activities. 
Figure 14 – Private sector earning premiums over the public sector in selected African countries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on household and labor force survey data. Sample: employed working age population 
with positive weekly earnings. 
 
                                                           
9 On this hypothesis, see for example Stampini and Verdier-Chouchane (2011) for Tunisia. 20 
 
Table 3 – Labor market profile of selected African countries 
   (a) % of Working Age Population  (b ) % of Employed Working Age Population 
Country  Year  Note  N.Obs  Inactive 
Unempl-
oyed  Employed  Total  N.Obs 
Public 






wage  Total 
Botswana  2006  *  15,844  35.69  11.91  52.40  100  8,256  22.45  3.95  23.12  15.24  35.24  100 
Congo Rep.  2005  *  13,919  29.52  13.87  56.61  100  7,866  9.48  1.95  7.56  6.00  74.97  100 
Egypt  1988  *  15,398  39.64  4.22  56.15  100  8,435  18.79  8.77  11.22  11.79  49.44  100 
Egypt  1998  *  14,633  39.23  5.72  55.05  100  7,766  23.98  5.22  13.27  11.42  46.12  100 
Egypt  2006  *  23,696  37.19  4.50  58.31  100  13,483  20.75  3.95  18.14  10.02  47.14  100 
Ethiopia  2005  *  54,067  28.44  2.02  69.55  100  31,680  2.20  1.65  6.22  89.92  100 
Ghana  1999  **  10,360  15.20  2.41  82.38  100  9,627  6.12  0.57  0.84  5.85  86.64  100 
Ghana  2006  *  19,869  26.07  3.59  70.35  100  13,881  5.69  0.28  1.99  12.83  79.25  100 
Nigeria  2004  **  38,321  43.23  0.82  55.95  100  31,338  7.40  0.57  0.27  8.47  83.29  100 
Madagascar  2005  ***  n.a.  11.90  2.29  85.81  100  n.a.  13.50  86.50  100 
Malawi  2004  **  24,972  14.19  0.74  85.06  100  10,539  7.49  1.48  11.49  13.57  65.97  100 
Mali  2007  *  7,156  25.27  2.68  72.05  100  5,113  2.56  0.58  0.41  4.69  91.76  100 
Rwanda  2006  *  16,439  21.00  0.21  78.79  100  9,999  2.66  1.05  1.17  24.04  71.08  100 
Senegal  2001  *  13,508  59.25  8.17  32.59  100  2,694  6.90  0.81  12.01  11.26  69.02  100 
Senegal (Dakar)  2003  *  11,332  38.64  7.09  54.27  100  5,917  5.93  1.87  6.73  23.44  62.15  100 
Senegal  2005  *  71,155  50.00  5.01  44.99  100  31,020  5.00  0.82  18.83  75.35  100 
South Africa  2000  *  64,995  40.78  15.07  44.15  100  27,312  14.60  2.99  41.24  17.51  23.59  100 
South Africa  2007  *  65,209  43.05  12.95  44.00  100  25,474  13.83  2.17  45.58  20.94  17.48  100 
Southern Sudan  2009  *  15,627  67.64  3.45  28.91  100  4,821  25.92  74.08  100 
Uganda   2006  *  18,292  17.03  1.75  81.22  100  14,663  2.84  14.19  82.98  100 
Tanzania  2006  *  35,323  9.99  2.90  87.11  100  30,468  2.62  0.40  1.48  4.98  90.53  100 
Zambia  2003  *  28,279  21.03  4.43  74.55  100  19,661  4.72  1.22  3.29  6.29  84.64  100 
Source: Authors' elaboration based on data sources listed in Table A1. Notes: Statistics for Congo and Ghana 1999 are unweigthed due to unavailability of the weight variable; (*) reference 
period last 7 days; (**) reference period 7 days for panel (a), last 12 months for panel (b); (***) Source: UNDP (2010); reference period and number of observations not specified in the source. 
N.a. = not available.  21 
 
Table 4 – Determinant of (log) weekly earnings (marginal effects) in selected African countries 
Country  Botswana  Egypt  Ghana 
Year  2006  1988  1998  2006  1999  2006 
Reference period   7 days   7 days   7 days   7 days   12 months   7 days 
N. of observations   15,808   14,983   13,601   23,486   13,131   19,747  
N. of uncensored obs.  6,145   3,873   4,554   7,348  7,410   9,012 
Independent variables:  dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx    
Female (dummy)  -0.252  ***  -0.265  ***  -0.138  ***  -0.207  ***  -0.312  ***  -0.280  *** 
Age 25-34 (dummy, omitted 15-24)  0.290  ***  0.392  ***  0.219  ***  0.197  ***  0.122  *    0.150  **  
Age 35-44  0.556  ***  0.848  ***  0.483  ***  0.377  ***  0.326  ***  0.249  *** 
Age 45-54  0.640  ***  1.173  ***  0.931  ***  0.655  ***  0.306  ***  0.315  *** 
Age 55-64  0.701  ***  1.119  ***  1.059  ***  0.972  ***  0.242  ***  0.324  *** 
Education:  primary (dummy, 
omitted less than primary) 
0.206  ***  0.116  ***  0.183  ***  0.030       0.101  **   0.018      
Education: lower secondary  0.489  ***  0.141  ***  0.195  ***  0.120  ***  0.149  ***  0.090  **  
Education: secondary  1.138  ***  0.567  ***  0.669  ***  0.344  ***  0.281  **   0.241  *** 
Education: vocational  1.889  ***  0.303  ***  0.283  ***  0.157  ***  0.519  ***  0.465  *** 
Education: university or higher  4.888  ***  0.813  ***  0.797  ***  0.542  ***  1.418  ***  1.555  *** 
Sector of activity:                                                 
industry (dummy, omitted primary)  0.765  ***  -  -  -  -  0.278  ***  1.509  ***  1.212  *** 
Sector of activity: services  0.602  ***  -  -  -  -  0.162  ***  1.586  ***  1.125  *** 
Type of employer:  state owned 
enterprise (omitted public) 
0.200  ***  0.338  ***  0.413  ***  0.239  ***  -0.015       -0.052      
Type of employer: private  -0.357  ***  0.384  ***  0.425  ***  0.147  ***  -0.259  ***  -0.142  *** 
Labor market state: informal/ 
temporary wage employee 
(dummy, omitted 
formal/permanent wage empl.) 
-0.295  ***  -0.137  ***  -0.175  ***  -0.274  ***  -0.224  ***  -0.311  *** 
Ganyu  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Employer  0.788  ***  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.162       0.116      
Self employed  -0.551  ***  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.101       -0.282  *** 
Unpaid family worker  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.385  ***  -0.392  *** 
N. hours worked per week  0.003  ***  0.005  ***  0.005  ***  0.002  ***  0.014  ***  0.006  *** 
Rural  -0.190  *    0.083  ***  0.049  **   0.046  **   -0.088  ***  -0.061  *   
Source: Authors' elaboration based on data sources listed in Table A1. Note: figures represent marginal effects for continuous 




Table  4  (continued)  –  Determinant  of  (log)  weekly  earnings  (marginal  effects)  in  selected  African 
countries 
Country  Malawi  Mali  Nigeria  Rwanda 
Senegal 
(Dakar) 
Year  2004  2007  2004  2006  2003 
Reference period   12 months   7 days   12 months   7 days   7 days 
N. of observations    25,279   6,922   48,662   16,410   10,871  
N. of uncensored obs.  10,400    3,850   12,511   2,916   4,461  
Independent variables:  dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx    
Female (dummy)  -0.275  ***  -0.482  ***  -0.214  ***  0.149  ***  -0.326  *** 
Age 25-34 (dummy, omitted 15-24)  0.377  ***  0.188  ***  -0.197  **   0.110  **   0.124  **  
Age 35-44  0.581  ***  0.271  ***  -0.230  **   0.229  ***  0.207  *** 
Age 45-54  0.562  ***  0.251  ***  -0.191  *    0.388  ***  0.313  *** 
Age 55-64  0.511  ***  0.439  ***  -0.157       0.600  ***  0.293  *** 
Education:  primary (dummy, 
omitted less than primary) 
0.275  ***  0.247  ***  0.099  **   0.481  ***  0.310  *** 
Education: lower secondary  0.719  ***  0.584  ***  0.236  ***  1.743  ***  0.584  *** 
Education: secondary  1.428  ***  0.833  ***  0.376  ***  1.075  ***  1.046  *** 
Education: vocational  2.751  ***  1.340  ***  0.255  ***  0.560  ***  0.874  *** 
Education: university or higher  9.034  ***  2.108  ***  0.839  ***  4.155  ***  1.382  *** 
Sector of activity:                                                 
industry (dummy, omitted primary) 
0.224  ***  -0.140  ***  -     0.772  ***  -0.193  **  
Sector of activity: services  0.145  ***  0.127  ***  -     0.317  ***  -0.249  *** 
Type of employer:  state owned 
enterprise (omitted public) 
0.189  ***  0.071       -0.115       0.198  *    0.186  **  
Type of employer: private  -0.003       -0.149  *    -0.292  ***  0.177  **   -0.154  *** 
Labor market state: informal/ 
temporary wage employee (dummy, 
omitted formal/permanent wage 
empl.) 
-0.171  ***  0.122       -0.154  ***  0.833  ***  -0.511  *** 
Ganyu  -0.908  ***  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Employer  -  -  0.214       -0.272  ***  -  -  -0.061      
Self employed  -  -  0.119  **   0.031       -  -  -0.701  *** 
Unpaid family worker  -     -  -  -0.464  ***  -  -  -0.477  *** 
N. hours worked per week  0.001       0.004  ***  0.010  ***  0.000       0.007  *** 
Rural  -0.513  ***        -0.224  ***  0.156  ***  -  - 
Source: Authors' elaboration based on data sources listed in Table A1. Note: figures represent marginal effects for continuous 




Table  4  (continued)  –  Determinant  of  (log)  weekly  earnings  (marginal  effects)  in  selected  African 
countries 
Country  South Africa  Tanzania  Uganda  Zambia 
Year  2000  2007  2006  2006  2003 
Reference period   7 days   7 days   7 days   12 months   7 days 
N. of observations    63,565    64,637     35,023   17,999   27,504  
N. of uncensored obs.     20,952   18,304   10,193   4,245   5,989  
Independent variables:  dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx     dy/dx    
Female (dummy)  -0.300  ***   -0.285  ***  -0.322  ***  -0.212  ***  0.206  *** 
Age 25-34 (dummy, omitted 15-24)  0.081  ***   0.014       0.164  ***  0.181  ***  0.203  *** 
Age 35-44  0.355  ***   0.154  ***  0.184  ***  0.278  ***  0.420  *** 
Age 45-54  0.476  ***   0.301  ***  0.160  ***  0.229  ***  0.459  *** 
Age 55-64  0.514  ***   0.324  ***  0.126  **   0.198  ***  0.339  *** 
Education:  primary (dummy, 
omitted less than primary) 
0.315  ***   0.331  ***  0.153  ***  0.130  ***  0.259  *** 
Education: lower secondary  0.738  ***   0.682  ***  0.177  ***  0.404  ***  0.562  *** 
Education: secondary  1.540  ***   1.319  ***  0.626  ***  0.759  ***  1.497  *** 
Education: vocational  3.175  ***   3.154  ***  0.624  ***  0.820  ***  2.586  *** 
Education: university or higher  5.767  ***   6.029  ***  1.807  ***  3.023  ***  5.265  *** 
Sector of activity:                                                 
industry (dummy, omitted primary) 
0.788  ***   0.523  ***  0.307     0.498  ***  0.568  *** 
Sector of activity: services  0.278  ***   0.163  ***  0.380     0.256  ***  0.575  *** 
Type of employer:  state owned 
enterprise (omitted public) 
-0.020        0.035       0.292  *** 
-0.195  *** 
0.631  *** 
Type of employer: private  -0.377  ***   -0.364  ***  -0.343  ***  0.134  *** 
Labor market state: informal/ 
temporary wage employee 
(dummy, omitted 
formal/permanent wage empl.) 
-0.410  ***   -0.377  ***  -0.461  ***  -0.206  ***  -0.436  *** 
Ganyu  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Employer 
-0.267  ***   -0.338  *** 
1.469  ***  -  -  3.581  *** 
Self employed  0.568  ***  -  -  -0.372  *** 
Unpaid family worker  -0.172        -0.376  ***  -  -  -  -  -    
N. hours worked per week  0.006  ***   0.007  ***  0.004  ***  0.002  **   -    
Rural  -0.209  ***   -  -  -0.085  ***  -0.204  ***  -0.160  *** 
Source: Authors' elaboration based on data sources listed in Table A1. Note: figures represent marginal effects for continuous 




6. Conclusions  
Although over 50 years of post-colonial history several African countries have experimented with State 
planning of economic activities, it is now widely acknowledged that private sector development is a key 
pillar of growth and development. Consequently, development finance institutions have invested growing 
amounts of money to support both the reform of regulations aimed to improve the business climate, and 
strategic  private  sector  operations  expected  to  catalyze  further  private  sector  development  through 
linkages and demonstration effects. Yet, surprisingly little research has been conducted to measure the size 
of the private sector in each African country. 
In this paper, we fill a knowledge gap by presenting novel estimates of the size of the private sector in 50 
African countries over the period 1996-2008, derived from the analysis of national accounts from the 
African Economic Outlook master data set. We show that the private sector accounts for about 2/3 of total 
investments,  4/5  of  total  consumption  and  3/4  of  total  credit.  Cross-country  variability  is  large.  For 
example, the private sector’s share ranges from 18% in Burundi to 89% in Morocco for total investment; 
from 54% in Angola to 92% in Guinea for consumption; and from 8% in Liberia to 211% in Angola for credit. 
We find statistically significant differences across country groupings only for consumption, which is higher 
in low income countries (81% against 74% in middle income countries), and lower in oil exporting countries 
(75% against 80% for net oil importers). In relative terms, large private sector countries are concentrated in 
Western Africa (Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, Senegal and Togo), Central Africa (Cameroun, Republic of 
Congo) and Eastern Africa (Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania), with the addition of Mauritius. Countries 
with small private sectors include a sample of oil-exporters (Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and 
Nigeria), some of the poorest countries in the continent (Burundi, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Mali and 
Sao Tome e Principe), Zambia and Botswana.  
Over the last ten years, the size of the private sector has remained stable. Also in this case, however, 
country variability was large. For example, the private sector grew most remarkably in Liberia, where the 
private share of consumption, investment and credit increased respectively by 26, 3 and 18 percentage 
points. At the opposite end of the distribution, the private sector recorded the strongest contraction in 
Equatorial Guinea, where the private share of investment and consumption fell by 45 and 5 percentage 
points  respectively.  In  general,  the  size  of  the  private  sector  has  been  contracting  significantly  in  oil 
exporting  countries.  However,  neither  its  size  nor  the  variation  in  its  size  appear  to  be  significantly 
correlated with growth performance. 
We complement the estimates based on national accounts with measures derived from household and 
labor force survey data from 16 countries, including some of the largest economies (e.g. Egypt, Nigeria, 
South Africa), and a good mix of middle and low income countries in all African regions. We show that the 
private sector employs on average 55% of working age individuals, and provides 90% of available jobs. The 
private sector share of employment ranges from a minimum of 71% in Egypt in 1998 and a maximum of 
97% in Tanzania in 2006. Evidence of large size is however tempered by the low quality of most private 
sector jobs, as only 1 out of 10 workers hold permanent/formal wage employment. Permanent/formal 
wage employment opportunities in the private sector are relatively abundant only in the three middle 
income countries in the sample, peaking at 46% of total employment in South Africa, 23% in Botswana and 
18% in Egypt. These are also the countries with the largest public sector employment (including state 
owned enterprises), hence with the largest formal sector in general. 25 
 
In addition to being mostly informal, private sector employment is also associated with a negative earning 
premium (which holds after controlling for job characteristics such as formality). The gap averages 13%, and 
is largest in South Africa where private sector workers earn 38% less than their peers in the public sector. 
At the other end of the distribution, private sector workers are paid relatively more than public sector 
workers in Egypt, Zambia and Rwanda, with the differential peaking at 18% in Rwanda. Negative private 
sector earning premiums have serious policy implications, as they may reduce private sector development 
by leading high skill individuals to less productive (but more stable and better paid) jobs in the public 
sector. 
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Annex 
Table A1. List of household and labor force surveys 
Country  Year  Name of survey 
Botswana  2005-2006  Botswana Labor Force Survey 2005-2006 
Congo  2005  Enquête Congolaise Auprès des Ménages (ECOM) 
Egypt  1988; 1998; 2006  Egypt Labor Market Survey 1988-1998-2006 
Ethiopia  2005  Ethiopia Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) 
Ghana  1999; 2006  Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 4 and 5) 
Madagascar  2005  United  Nations  Development  Program  (UNDP).  2010.  Micro 
Entreprises, Emploi et Developpement Humain 
Malawi  2004  Second Integrated Household Survey  (IHS-2) 
Mali  2007  Enquête Permanente Emploi Auprès de Ménages 2007 
Nigeria  2003-2004  Nigeria Living Standards Survey (NLSS) 
Rwanda  2006  Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vies des Ménages (EICV) 
Senegal  2001  Enquête Sénégalaise Auprès des Ménages (ESAM) 
Senegal  2003  Enquête  Sur  l'Emploi,  le  Secteur  Informel  et  la  Demande  des 
Ménages  Sur l'agglomération Urbaine de Dakar Enquête 1-2-3 
Senegal  2005  Enquête de Suivi de la Pauvreté au  Sénégal (ESPS) 
South Africa  2000; 2007  Labor Force Survey  (LFS) 
Southern Sudan  2009  National Poverty Survey 2009 
Tanzania  2006  Integrated Labor Force Survey (ILFS) 
Uganda   2006  Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) 
Zambia  2002-2003  Zambia Living Conditions Monitoring Survey III (LCMS III) 
 